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Abstract
This project proposes PriView, a privacy-preserving technique for querying third-party ser-
vices from mobile devices. Classical private information retrieval (PIR) schemes are diffi-
cult to deploy and use, since they require the target service to be replicated and modified.
To avoid this problem, PriView utilizes a novel, proxy-mediated form of PIR, in which
the client device fetches XORs of dummy query responses from each of two proxies and
combines them to produce the required result. Unlike conventional PIR, PriView does not
require the third-party service to be replicated or modified in any way. We evaluated a
PriView implementation for the Google Static Maps service utilizing an Android OS front-
end and Amazon EC2 proxies. PriView is able to provide tunable confidentiality with low
overhead, allowing bandwidth usage, power consumption, and end-to-end latency to scale
sublinearly with the provided degree of confidentiality.
Acknowledgements
This Masters thesis is the result of the help and support of people in my professional and
personal life, without whom, my efforts would not have come to fruition. First and fore-
most of them would be my advisor, Dr. Melody Moh, who believed in me when I didn’t
and who pursuaded me to trust my capabilities. I have tested her kindness and patience on
innumerable occasions, only to realize that she has immense reserves of them. Her guid-
ance and support made this project reach its potential and result into posters, a conference
paper and finally, a Masters thesis. She has been a mentor and a guide and an advisor in
the true sense of the word and I am extremely grateful to her.
I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my committee members - Dr. Teng-Sheng
Moh: thank you very much for making my defense an enjoyable experience. I value your
comments and suggestions very much; Rafael Alvarez-Horine: thanks for having done all
this right before me and for sharing your experiences and valuable wisdom, I escaped many
a pitfalls because of them. Not to mention the immense knowledge of Cloud Computing
that was such a huge help with the basic premise of the project.
This acknowledgement would be incomplete without thanking Dr. Sami Khuri - he con-
verted me to a CS major by just one course of his. He is one of the few incredibly inspiring
people I have had the pleasure to meet in my life. The other people that came into my life
through this Masters and made it an incredibly fun experience, were the friends I made
here. They helped me grow by their knowledge and drive, they helped me through difficult
times and made every minute I spent on campus a very happy experience.
The kind of support and incouragement I get from the people in my workplace, Hewlett-
v
Packard, is beyond belief. They have played an important part in my being able to complete
this degree and I am extremely grateful to them.
On the personal front, my parents and brother have given me their unequivocal support
throughout, as always, for which my mere expression of thanks likewise does not suffice.
My in-laws have been pillars of support and have encouraged me endlessly - I can’t thank
them enough for being there for me always. I would also save a tiny, little thanks for my
tiny, little furbaby, Dunkie. Her warm cuddles and unconditional love got me through many
all-nighters.
Above all, I would like to acknowledge the amazing support of my partner-in-crime and
the reason behind my ever stepping into this degree, Mahesh. He gave me a new life, a new
mindset and a new career and more importantly, he learned how to make endless cups of
chai to get me through this Masters. I am not quite sure what I did to deserve his love and
the kindness of all the people that helped me in every possible way through the last three





1.1 Existing solutions for privacy-preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Introduction to PriView . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Background 5
2.1 Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 k-Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 PIR (Private Information Retrieval) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 The PriView Technique 10
3.1 The Basic scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Multiple proxies for lower latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Generating dummy queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5 Network attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5.1 Attack on client-cloud connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5.2 Attack on cloud-query server connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6 SSL Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6.1 SSLSocketFactory Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.6.2 Implementation of SSL Sockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Evaluation 24
4.1 Experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Bandwidth usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vii
4.3 End-to-end delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26




1 Use of dummies and fuzzy location for location privacy. . . . . . . . . . 8
2 The PriView technique: each proxy accepts a set of dummy queries
from the client, issues them to the service, and returns an XOR of a
subset of the responses to the client. The subsets are chosen so that the
actual response required (A′ in this example) can be reconstructed by
the client. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 MITM using Wireshark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Log file generated by the tampered code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Encrypted requests and responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6 As the degree of confidentiality (i.e., the total number of requests seen
by the service per query) is increased, bandwidth increases sub-linearly
for PriView as request packets become larger, and linearly for conven-
tional dummy queries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7 As the degree of confidentiality is increased, latency increases sub-
linearly for PriView. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8 Power consumption increases sub-linearly for PriView as degree of
confidentiality is increased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
ix
1 Introduction
The emergence of ubiquitous, high-bandwidth 3G/4G connectivity has enabled a new
class of Internet services designed to be accessed from smartphones and tablets. Examples
range from mundane services such as maps and restaurant reviews to more exotic applica-
tions such as augmented reality (e.g., the Google Glass [1]). Unfortunately, the convenience
of ubiquitous connectivity comes at the price of privacy. When a user accesses a map of her
immediate surroundings, she reveals her location to the mapping service. When she looks
up the price of a house or a car, she provides information to marketers. When she browses
restaurant reviews, she reveals her dietary preferences to the review website.
1.1 Existing solutions for privacy-preservation
Existing solutions protect privacy by sacrificing either efficiency or accuracy. In the first
category are solutions where the user’s device makes multiple ‘dummy’ queries to the
Internet service for each valid query [2]. For example, a user accessing a mapping service
might provide multiple locations in order to hide her actual location; the service then knows
that she is at one of the locations but does not know which one. However, this approach
results in multiple responses (in this example, maps) being returned to the device from
the service, wasting both bandwidth and power on the device. A solution of the second
category involves ‘jittering’ the input [3], preventing the service from knowing the exact
input (e.g., the exact location of the user); however, this means that the user is returned
approximate answers (e.g., a map of a nearby location), which may not always be useful.
A different type of solution places a cloud-hosted proxy between the user and the service;
however, this requires the user to completely trust the cloud provider, who is aware of both
the identity of the user as well as the contents of the query.
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1.2 Introduction to PriView
In this paper, we present PriView, a new technique that allows mobile devices to access
Internet services without sacrificing privacy, efficiency or accuracy. In Priview, to send
a query to an Internet service, the device includes it along with a single set of dummy
queries that it sends to two different cloud-hosted proxies. Each cloud proxy relays the set
of queries to the third-party service and sends back an XOR of a predetermined subset of
the responses to the device. The subsets are chosen a priori by the client such that they
are identical across the two proxies, except that one contains the actual query’s response
while the other does not. This ensures that combining the two XORs cancels out dummy
responses and provides the response to the actual query.
The PriView technique preserves data confidentiality. When a user issues a query using
it, no entity in the system can determine whether it’s a real or dummy query. Each cloud
proxy is aware of the identity of the querying device but does not know the actual query
being issued, since it is provided with a set of dummy queries. The Internet service knows
neither the exact query being issued nor the identity of the querying device. Unless the two
cloud proxies collude with each other, no single entity is aware of the exact query that was
issued. In practice, our assumption that cloud proxies do not collude can be satisfied by
running each proxy in a different cloud provider (e.g., on Amazon EC2 [4] and Microsoft
Azure [5]).
Importantly, PriView achieves these privacy properties efficiently. For each query, the
device sends two outgoing messages (one to each proxy), each of which is a list of dummy
query inputs that fits into a single network packet. It receives back two XORs, each of
which is the size of a regular response. Accordingly, the bandwidth and power consumption
of our technique scale sub-linearly with the degree of confidentiality (i.e., the size of the
dummy set), in contrast to the linear scaling provided by conventional dummy queries.
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Increasing the size of the dummy set – and hence, increasing the degree of confiden-
tiality – has a sub-linear impact on bandwidth and power consumption. The number of
messages sent and received do not change (until the dummy set no longer fits in a single
outgoing network packet). In other words, changing the degree of confidentiality from 8 to
16 increases the bandwidth and power consumption by much less than a factor of two. As
a result, a PriView query uses approximately twice the bandwidth of a conventional query,
and uses up a correspondingly larger amount of battery life. In addition, each query re-
quires extra computation in the form of the XOR operation to retrieve the actual response,
which results in increased power consumption. Unlike existing schemes based on dummy
inputs, increasing the size of the dummy set – and hence, increasing the degree of confiden-
tiality – has an insignificant impact on bandwidth or power consumption, since the number
of messages sent and received do not change (until the dummy set no longer fits in a single
outgoing network packet).
PriView can be viewed as an adaptation of classical Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
schemes [6]. Such schemes typically require the service (or database) to be replicated
multiple times, as well as modified to return compact summaries (such as XORs) of mul-
tiple items. Replication or modification is typically not possible with real-world Internet
services. Instead, PriView inserts a replicated proxy layer between the end user and the
Internet service, and then uses PIR between the client and the proxies. This allows PriView
to implement a PIR-like scheme against an unmodified, unreplicated third-party service
such as Wikipedia or Google Static Maps [7].
We implemented a PriView client for Google Static Maps on the Android platform,
with cloud proxies running Amazon EC2. In our evaluation on an Android device, we
compare PriView against the strawman solution of issuing dummy queries. For a degree
of confidentiality equivalent to that obtained by issuing 64 dummy queries in the strawman
solution, PriView uses 14% of the bandwidth and 16% of the power consumed by the
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strawman, while delivering responses at 40% of the latency.
The rest of this report is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the existing work
in the field of user/query privacy. Section 3 explains the PriView system in detail, includ-
ing setup of the PIR scheme and implementation of the model proposed. A performance
evaluation is conducted in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper.
4
2 Background
Our primary goal is the following: when a user Bob sends a query Q to an Internet service
S using a mobile device, our goal is to guarantee that the service S cannot determine that
“Bob searched for Q”. Further, we want to provide this guarantee without adding too much
overhead on the client device in terms of bandwidth usage, end-to-end latency, or power
consumption. Finally, we want to make minimal assumptions about the trustworthiness of
third party entities such as cloud providers.
Existing solutions can be categorized according to the privacy guarantees they provide:
2.1 Anonymity
One option is to prevent service S from knowing who issued the query. This can be done
by inserting an anonymizing proxy between the device and the service. If a single proxy is
used, this approach has the disadvantage that the proxy can now see both the query as well
as the source IP address. End-to-end encryption at the application level between the client
device and the service S eliminates this problem; now the proxy can only see who sent
the request, while the service S can only see the contents of the request. However, traffic
analysis can still tease out the relationship between the request sent by the device and that
received by the service S; this problem can be solved by using more sophisticated proxying
techniques such as Onion Routing that use a network of proxies between the client and the
server.
Unfortunately, while techniques such as Onion Routing can effectively hide the network
address of the user’s device, the service can still discover the identity of the user’s device
from semantic information in the query itself [3]. For example, if the user searches for
“Thai restaurants near 42 Marlin Drive”, the service can infer that the person who lives at
42 Marlin Drive likes Thai food, and use public databases to identify this person as Bob.
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2.2 k-Anonymity
Accordingly, a second class of solutions attempts to prevent the service S from know-
ing who exactly out of a group of k people issued the query (a guarantee known as k-
anonymity [8]). In the case of location-based services, this can be achieved via ‘spatial
cloaking’, where the location included in the query is jittered slightly so that any person
within a particular radius of a location could have issued it. For example, the query might
become “Thai restaurants near 46 Marlin Drive”, in which case the service S does not know
which resident of Marlin Drive actually issued the query. However, this solution only works
for applications where the input domain is continuous and can be jittered without rendering
the output unusable; for example, if Bob wants to search for “the history of Thailand” on
Wikipedia, it’s not clear how we would jitter this input, and whether the resulting output
would still be useful to Bob. As a result, spatial cloaking is useful mostly in the context of
location-based applications where certain population density conditions are met, and is too
specific for our use case of querying general-purpose Internet services.
A different way to achieve k-anonymity is to generate a set of dummy queries in addi-
tion to its original query; for example, the client might send the queries “Thai restaurants
near 42 Marlin Drive”, “Thai restaurants near 77 Turtle Ave”, and “Thai restaurants near
24 Swordfish Road”, in which case the service cannot determine which of the three users
issued the query. One problematic aspect of this approach is that it requires a trusted
anonymizing proxy that knows identifying attributes (e.g., location) of sufficient users in
the system so that it can generate valid queries identifying them. Eliminating the trusted
proxy and generating dummy queries on the client is possible, but requires distributed
mechanisms that allow each client to know the identifying attributes of other clients in the
system, which in turn requires clients to trust each other.
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2.3 Confidentiality
A promising alternative is for the client to eschew k-anonymity and instead use randomly
generated dummy queries to provide a different guarantee, in which the service S knows
exactly who issued the query, but does not know which query was actually issued. In this
case, the client simply generates a set of random dummy queries that do not necessarily
correspond to other users in the system, but simply constitute valid, arbitrarily chosen in-
puts to the service (e.g., “X restaurants near GPS coordinates Y”, where X is a random
cuisine type and Y is a random street address) . Such schemes have been proposed in
the context of DNS privacy [9, 10]. While these dummy queries can be generated by the
device inexpensively without coordinating with other clients or a trusted proxy, the prob-
lem still remains this scheme introduces overhead that increases linearly with the degree of
confidentiality required; a dummy query set of k messages results in k extra requests and
responses, massively increasing the bandwidth usage, power consumption, and end-to-end
latency of the original query.
2.4 PIR (Private Information Retrieval)
To make random dummy queries efficient, one avenue is Private Information Retrieval [6].
In the simplest form of PIR, the service is replicated twice, and the client makes a query to
each replica with a set of inputs. The sets of inputs in the two queries are identical, except
that one contains the actual input and the other doesn’t. Each of the replicas returns a single
XOR of the requested responses, which the client then combines to retrieve the response to
its actual input.
PIR is defined as follows: a server S holds a database with n bits, X = (X1 . . .Xn). A
user u has a particular index i and wishes to retrieve the value of Xi, without disclosing to
S the value of i. The PIR concept was introduced in [6] in an information theoretic setting,
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Figure 1: Use of dummies and fuzzy location for location privacy.
requiring that even if S had infinite computational power, it could not find i. It is proven in
[6] that in any solution with a single server, you must receive the entire database. Neverthe-
less, in practice, it is sufficient to ensure that S cannot find i with polynomial-time compu-
tations; this problem is known as Computational PIR. The concept of PIR has been around
since 1998, but it has been considered a more theoretical solution for database issues. In
the recent years, the technology of cloud computing has shown tremendous potential and
hence researchers have tried making PIR work with cloud to make it more practical. In
2008, Ghinita et al. studied a case similar to this project’s – they studied the privacy of
location-based information queried via mobile phones. They propose a framework for pri-
vate location-dependent queries, which uses PIR protocols and eliminates the need for any
trusted third party. They developed algorithms for approximate and exact private near-
est neighbor search and utilized data mining techniques to optimize query execution. [11]
Their experimental results suggest that PIR approaches incur reasonable overhead and are
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applicable in practice. They however, do not use a cloud as server but use a traditional
server for the purpose of their study which might be able to reduce the high CPU cost they
encounter.
Such a scheme has the advantage that it provides a strong guarantee – each replica of the
service does not know which of the requested inputs is the actual one – in a very efficient
manner, requiring the device to send two requests and receive two responses, regardless
of the number of dummy inputs involved. However, PIR comes at a significant cost; it
requires the service to be replicated, which may not be possible with real-world services
such as Google Maps or Wikipedia. Additionally, PIR requires the service to be modified
so it returns some compact function of the set of responses (an XOR in the case of the
2-replica scheme), which again may not be possible with third-party services.
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3 The PriView Technique
PriView implements PIR without requiring the target service to be modified. It achieves
this goal by inserting a layer of proxies in between the client device and the service. In
effect, each proxy appears to the device as a replicated copy of the service, modified to
return XORs instead of first-class responses.
3.1 The Basic scheme
• Step 1. When the client wants to issue a query A to a service, it first generates K − 1
other random dummy queries (K is 3 in the figure, and the dummy queries are B and
C). It then sends a message requesting the set of queries {A,B,C} to both proxies.
Each proxy can see the identity of the client but does not know which of the three
queries is the actual one.
• Step 2./3. Each proxy separately issues each of the queries A, B and C to the target
service and receives the responses A′, B′, and C ′. The target service does not know
the identity of the client, and cannot determine which of the three queries is the actual
one.
• Step 4. When a proxy gets back all the responses from the service, it combines
a subset of them into an XOR. A bitmask determining this subset is provided by
the client to the proxy in each request message. The subsets XORed by the two
proxies are identical, except that one contains the actual query and the other doesn’t.
For example, in the figure, one proxy returns {A′, B′} while the other returns {B′}.
Whether a particular query’s response is included in the XOR or not does not reveal
any information to the proxy, since it could be a dummy query in either case: if it is
included in the XOR, it could also be included in the other proxy’s XOR, and if it’s
not, it might be missing in the other proxy’s XOR.
10
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Figure 2: The PriView technique: each proxy accepts a set of dummy queries from
the client, issues them to the service, and returns an XOR of a subset of the responses
to the client. The subsets are chosen so that the actual response required (A′ in this
example) can be reconstructed by the client.
When the client receives both XORs, it combines them to reconstruct the response to the
actual query. In figure 1., (A′ +B′) + (B′) = A′.
This simple scheme provides the client data confidentiality with respect to the proxies.
In other words, the proxy knows the identity of the client and a set of possible queries, but
does not know exactly which query was issued by the client. It provides both confidentiality
and anonymity with respect to the target service, which knows neither the identity of the
client device or the exact query it issued.
In terms of efficiency, each first-class query issued by the client results in two outgoing
messages, containing a list of K queries and a bitmask of K bits determining the subset to
be returned, and two incoming messages, each of which is an XOR of multiple responses.
Increasing the value of K provides a higher degree of confidentiality without increasing
11
overhead significantly at the client; each additional dummy query results in a few extra
bytes on the outgoing message. The size of the response XOR only increases if the newly
added dummy query happens to generate the largest response out of all the queries.
3.2 Multiple proxies for lower latency
In the two-proxy scheme described above, the client has to always wait for the slowest
of the two proxies to respond before reconstructing the answer. Using more proxies can
mitigate this problem, with each proxy returning a linear combination of the responses it
receives (rather than the XOR of a subset as before). The linear combinations generated
by different proxies are identical, except that they use different coefficients for the actual
query response. This allows the client to reconstruct the actual query response from the
first two proxies that respond. For example, if a device wants to make an actual query A, it
constructs a dummy set of queries {A,B,C,D} and sends this to three proxies P1 and P2
and P3. The proxies then return:
P1 returns A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
P2 returns 2A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
P3 returns 3A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
The client can then extract the value of A′ from these two linear combinations, since
B′, C ′ and D′ cancel out by virtue of having equal coefficients. To implement this scheme,
the client includes a set of coefficients in its request message to the proxies, instead of a
bitmask as before. Note that the simpler two-proxy XOR-of-subset scheme is equivalent to
the case where the linear combination exclusively uses binary coefficients; the bitmask can
be thought of as a set of binary coefficients.
Unfortunately, it does not provide confidentiality with respect to the service. Since the
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service is not replicated, it can observe all incoming queries and infer the actual query. In
Figure 2, the service sees the following sequence of requests arrive in a short time span:
(A,B,C,B,C). From this sequence, it can infer that A is the actual query made by the
client, even though it doesn’t know the network address of the client. For some applications,
knowing the actual query is often enough to compromise the identity of the user (as in the
previously mentioned example where the user searches for restaurants near her house).
To support confidentiality for such applications, we modify the PriView technique to
use linear combinations of responses instead of simple XORs. In this scheme, the dummy
query sets sent to each proxy are perfectly identical; they all include the actual query,
unlike the XOR-based scheme where one of the sets did not include the actual query. The
proxies no longer reply with simple XORs of the query responses; instead, they return
linear equations of the query responses, where the coefficients of each dummy response are
identical across proxies but the coefficients of the actual response are different. The device
can then solve the resulting system of linear equations to extract the actual response.
The resulting scheme provides confidentiality with respect to the proxies, which see a
set of queries as in the earlier XOR-based scheme, as well as confidentiality with respect to
the service, which now sees the stream of requests (A,B,C,A,B,C) from the two proxies
and hence cannot determine that A is the actual query being made.
Linear combinations also enable us to use more than two proxies to reduce request la-
tency. In the two-proxy scheme, the client has to always wait for the slowest of the two
proxies to respond before reconstructing the answer. Using more proxies can mitigate this
problem, with each proxy returning a linear combination with a different coefficient for the
actual query response, so that the client only has to wait for the first two proxies to respond.
For example, in addition to proxies P1 and P2 above, the client might also use proxy P3,
which returns:
P3 returns 3A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
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The latency benefit of using more than two proxies comes at a cost. It requires the
device to send out more network packets for each query, one per proxy. In addition, the
device receives multiple responses back, one from each proxy; it can attempt to short-
circuit these responses by notifying the remaining proxies once it has heard back from the
first two, this requires more outgoing packets that may not always reach the proxies in time.
Each wasted response increases the bandwidth and battery overhead for the query.
This approach results in improved latency, since the device now has to only wait for
the fastest two responders out of a potentially large number of proxies. However, it has
a number of drawbacks. First, it requires more complex and battery-draining logic on the
device to solve linear equations, rather than the simple XOR operations of the two-proxy
solution. Second, it requires the device to send out more network packets for each query,
one per proxy. Third, the device receives multiple responses back, one from each proxy; it
can attempt to short circuit these responses by notifying the remaining proxies once it has
heard back from the first two, but each extra proxy that responds increases the bandwidth
and battery overhead for the query.
The downside of using linear combinations instead of simple XORs is increased com-
plexity and possibly higher power consumption on the client device. In this paper, we
implement and evaluate the XOR-based scheme; in the future, we intend to quantify the
performance and power implications of using linear combinations.
3.3 Generating dummy queries
The PriView technique requires an effective, inexpensive way to generate random dummy
queries. Some services provide hooks for generating random queries; for example, Wikipedia
provides a special URL (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Random)
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that returns the article corresponding to a random query. For other applications, random
queries can be generated algorithmically; for example, a Google Maps query is simply a
latitude/longitude pair.
However, a truly random dummy query can fail to provide sufficient privacy. If a proxy
is presented with a dummy set of multiple latitude/longitude pairs, of which one is in a
major urban center while the others are in less populated areas, it can deduce that the
former is the actual query being made. Accordingly, care has to be taken that dummy
queries are indistinguishable from actual queries; in the case of geographical locations, this
can be achieved by biasing the sampling process, such that the probability that a location is
chosen is proportional to its population density.
3.4 Limitations
PriView does have limitations. It requires the Internet service to respond deterministically
to a given query; if the two cloud proxies can get different responses for the same dummy
queries, the device can no longer retrieve the original query’s response by combining the
two returned XORs. In addition, PriView is not relevant for services that require a user
login and store user-specific state, such as email or social networks; in this case, the service
already knows the identity of the user. Finally, as described above, it assumes that an
efficient means exists for generating random dummy queries to the service.
More than two proxies: PriView adds latency to queries by interposing proxies be-
tween the device and the Internet service. Not only does this add an extra hop to the query
path, but the device now has to wait for both proxies to respond, allowing query latency to
be determined by the slower of the two proxies.
To mitigate the problem of increased latency, PriView allows the use of more than two
proxies; the device sends a set of dummy queries to each proxies, and then waits for the first
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two that reply. This multi-proxy scheme is different from the two-proxy case in two ways.
First, the dummy query sets sent to each proxy are perfectly identical; they all include the
actual query, unlike the two-proxy case where one of the sets did not include the actual
query. Second, the proxies no longer reply with simple XORs of the query responses;
instead, they return linear equations of the query responses, where the coefficients of each
dummy response are identical across proxies but the coefficients of the actual response are
different. The device can then solve the resulting system of linear equations to extract the
actual response.
For example, if a device wants to make an actual query A, it constructs a dummy set of
queries (A,B,C,D) and sends this to three proxies (P1, P2, P3). If the response for A is
A′, the proxies then return:
P1 returns A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
P2 returns 2A′ + αB′ + βC ′ + γD′
Any two of these three equations can be used to reconstruct the value of A′, since B′,
C ′ and D′ cancel out by virtue of having equal coefficients.
3.5 Network attacks
We implemented two security attacks on PriView. Each of these attacks can be perpetrated
at the two levels of communication: between the application or user and the cloud and
between the cloud and the query server.
3.5.1 Attack on client-cloud connection
We implemented a man-in-the-middle attack in the communication between the user and
the cloud. This way the attacker will be able to eavesdrop on the connection thus making
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the private querying process no more private.
Man-in-the-Middle: The term ”Man-in-the-middle attack” (MITM attack) refers to the
type of attack where the attacker intrudes into the communication between the endpoints
on a network to inject false information and intercept the data transferred between them.
In cryptography, the man-in-the-middle attack or bucket-brigade attack (often abbreviated
MITM), sometimes Janus attack, is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker
makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between them, mak-
ing them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection when
in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. One of the objectives for MITM
attacks is to gain access to the client’s messages and modify them before finally transmitting
them to the server end. Other objectives of MITM can be to mislead the communicators at
the client or server end, to intercept pertinent information (e.g., identity, address, password,
or any other confidential information for malicious purposes) and also, at times, manipulate
transactions.
In this case, we are using MITM to intercept and eavesdrop on the location information
that the user sends to the cloud. The way these queries are formed is following - one of
the queries is entered by the user through the text box in the Android application. The user
(client) code then generates n number of random coordinates within a defined coordinate
space. The actual query, a string, is different from the randomly generated numbers as co-
ordinates. With a freely available sniffing software like Wireshark, any malicious attacker
using the same network as the client phone will be able to see all the packets coming and
going to and from all IP addresses on that network. This scenario can easily be envisioned
in a WiFi hotspot, like a cafe. We join the same free network on our phone as several other
people in the cafe. We use our phone to scout the map of the area on Google Maps, and
we use the secure application. We type the query in the textbox and hit send. While we are
using TCP socket connections in the code, the packets are still unencrypted. A Wireshark
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Figure 3: MITM using Wireshark.
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Figure 4: Log file generated by the tampered code
user is monitoring the packets on the free network in the cafe and they can see which IP
addresses are sending what information. In our case, the location string is easily visible,
with the IP addresses of source and destination machines. Thus, the privacy of our query is
compromised.
Suggested solution: There are two things that can be done to avoid the attack described
above. (a.) Provide end-to-end authentication, and (b.) Encrypt the query going from the
user to the cloud.
3.5.2 Attack on cloud-query server connection
One of the assumptions we made while creating this system was that the cloud instances
used for querying and XORing the results do not talk to each other. Let us assume the cloud
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provider we are using has a vested interest in checking all the requests sent to and from the
instances - for example, Amazon wants to personalize your holiday shopping experience
and knows that you have an AWS account. It wants to monitor the requests made through
this cloud to different query servers for any kind of clue. Amazon has access to your cloud
code and all it needs to do is to insert a small piece of code in it that will generate a log
file for all the requests made in all the instances you use. When it checks the two log files
generated by the two instances we use for this project, it is very easy to see what the user is
interested in it. Though highly unethical, if a cloud provider decides to use the information
you store on their servers, they can.
As an experiment, we put in a small piece of code that created a log file in each instance.
Figure 4 shows what the log file stored at the end of the run:
Suggested solution: The way to ensure that this does not happen is postulated in the so-
lution originally proposed - use two different cloud providers so they see the set of queries
each and can’t know accurately which one is the query user is actually interested in. An-
other assumption made for this project was that the service was deterministic. We can try
changing the content of the queries (for example, a Wikipedia page that is one of the queries
can be edited) between the time taken by the two clouds to query the same page.
3.6 SSL Encryption
SSL(Secure Socket Layer) is a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private
documents via the Internet. SSL uses a cryptographic system that uses two keys to encrypt
data a public key known to everyone and a private or secret key known only to the recipi-
ent of the message. Both Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer support SSL, and many
Web sites use the protocol to obtain confidential user information, such as credit card num-
bers. By convention, URLs that require an SSL connection start with https: instead of http.
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SSL aims to provide applications with a secure socket like toolkit. SSL addresses three
important security issues: 1.It provides authentication, which helps ensure the legitimacy
of the entities involved in a dialog. 2.It provides privacy. SSL helps warrant that a third
party cannot decipher the dialog between two entities. 3.It maintains integrity. The use of a
MAC (message authentication code), which is similar to a checksum, helps guarantee that
a dialog between two entities is not modified by a third party.
SSL relies heavily on both public-key and secret-key cryptography. It uses secret-key
cryptography to bulk-encrypt the data exchanged between two applications. SSL provides
the ideal solution because secret-key algorithms are both secure and fast. Public-key cryp-
tography, which is slower than secret-key cryptography, is a better choice for authentication
and key exchange.
3.6.1 SSLSocketFactory Class
SSLSocketFactory can be used to validate the identity of the HTTPS server against a list of
trusted certificates and to authenticate to the HTTPS server using a private key. SSLSock-
etFactory will enable server authentication when supplied with a trust-store file containing
one or several trusted certificates. The client secure socket will reject the connection dur-
ing the SSL session handshake if the target HTTPS server attempts to authenticate itself
with a non-trusted certificate. In special cases the standard trust verification process can
be bypassed by using a custom TrustStrategy. This interface is primarily intended for al-
lowing self-signed certificates to be accepted as trusted without having to add them to the
trust-store file. The following sequence of actions is used to generate a key-store file:
(i) Use JDK keytool utility to generate a new key:
keytool-genkey-v-alias"myclientkey"-validity365-keystoremy.keystore
For simplicity use the same password for the key as that of the key-store.
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(ii) Issue a certificate signing request (CSR):
keytool-certreq-alias"myclientkey"-filemycertreq.csr-keystoremy.
keystore
Send the certificate request to the trusted Certificate Authority for signature. One may
choose to act as her own CA and sign the certificate request using a PKI tool, such as
OpenSSL.
(iii) Import the trusted CA root certificate:
keytool-import-alias"mytrustedca"-filecaroot.crt-keystoremy.
keystore
(iv) Import the PKCS7 file containg the complete certificate chain:
keytool-import-alias"myclientkey"-filemycert.p7-keystoremy.keystore
(v) Verify the content the resultant keystore file:
keytool-list-v-keystoremy.keystore
3.6.2 Implementation of SSL Sockets
To implement SSL sockets, we generated the key using the keytool and embedded it in the
client code and copied it to each cloud instance. Also, a boolean was placed in the code
so that a flip can be made between the normal Socket connection and the SSL connection.
This was mainly to generate and compare unencrypted and encrypted data when needed.
When this boolean was true, the connection was made by the SSL sockets. The client
aunthenticates itself with the cloud using the stored keys. Then, encrypted requests are
sent to the cloud and responses coming back from the cloud are encrypted as well. When
the WireShark tool is used, as in stage 1, to sniff packets, it can be seen in figure 5 that all
the transactions are encrypted.
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We implemented an Android-based PriView client for the Google Static Maps [7] service,
with proxies running on Amazon EC2. We evaluated this client on a MK802 Android Mini-
PC running Android 4.0.3, as well as a Samsung S5570 Galaxy Mini running Android
2.3.3. Our comparison point was a client that issued multiple dummy requests for each
query directly from the device. Both PriView and this strawman client offer the same
confidentiality guarantee: if we use K dummy requests for each actual query, the service
cannot tell which of K + 1 requests the device actually made. We call K the degree
of confidentiality. The strawman client running with degree of confidentiality K = 0
corresponds to an unmodified, conventional client that does not provide any confidentiality.
We do not plotK = 0 for PriView, since our mechanism requires at least one dummy query
to be issued.
4.2 Bandwidth usage
Figure 6 shows the average bandwidth used by each query as we increase the degree of
confidentiality by issuing more dummy requests per query. As PriView issues more dummy
requests, the size of its outgoing messages go up linearly while the size of the returning
messages increases sub-linearly; each returning message is an XOR of multiple responses,
hence its size is equal to that of the largest response. Since each outgoing message is
simply a list of dummy inputs to the service (e.g., GPS coordinates or Wikipedia URLs),
it is much smaller than the returning message, which can be roughly 25 KB in the case of
Google Static Maps. As a result, total bandwidth used by PriView increases sub-linearly as

























Figure 6: As the degree of confidentiality (i.e., the total number of requests seen by
the service per query) is increased, bandwidth increases sub-linearly for PriView as
request packets become larger, and linearly for conventional dummy queries.
In contrast, we expect our comparison strawman to show a linear increase in bandwidth
usage, since it sends and receives K + 1 distinct requests and responses for each query,
in order to get a degree of confidentiality equal to K. Interestingly, we instead see sub-
linear scaling of bandwidth for small numbers of dummy queries; for example, going from
K = 1 toK = 2 does not double bandwidth used. This is an artefact of naive dummy query
generation; since we pick random GPS coordinates for each dummy query, they are likely
to fall on the ocean and return a highly compressible image of 2 to 3KB with no features. As
a result, adding dummy queries does not necessarily double bandwidth for the strawman.
However, if we used more intelligent dummy query generation based on population density,
the returned maps would be feature-rich and non-compressible, in which case we would
observe linear scaling of bandwidth. In summary, this graph makes two important points:
PriView is bandwidth-efficient compared to conventional dummy requests, and it does not
add much bandwidth overhead over an unmodified, non-confidential client (as seen by the



















Figure 7: As the degree of confidentiality is increased, latency increases sub-linearly
for PriView.
4.3 End-to-end delay
Figure 7 shows a similar trend for end-to-end latency. With the degree of confidentiality
at 1, the number of messages at the device is the same for both approaches, but PriView
has higher latency since it routes messages through its cloud proxies while the strawman
directly accesses the service. PriView begins to outperform the strawman once the degree
of confidentiality is reasonably high, since its large bandwidth advantage over the strawman
outweighs the delay imposed by its proxy layer.
4.4 Power consumption
Finally, Figure 8 plots the power consumed per query for PriView and the strawman. Since
the MK802 device we used does not have an internal battery and relies on external AC
power, we were able to measure instantaneous power draw with a Kill A Watt [12] mon-
itor. As shown in the graph, PriView’s power consumption stays nearly constant even as























Figure 8: Power consumption increases sub-linearly for PriView as degree of confi-
dentiality is increased.
5 Conclusion
Enabling privacy-preserving access to existing Internet services from mobile devices is a
challenging problem: devices are resource-constrained, while services cannot easily be
modified or replicated. PriView uses a novel approach to Private Information Retrieval that
utilizes cloud-based proxies to provide confidentiality, without imposing high overhead
on the device or requiring the target service to be modified or replicated. Our evaluation
showed that PriView works with existing services and provides tunable confidentiality that
imposes a sub-linear cost in terms of latency, bandwidth usage and power consumption.
In this project, we focused on fine-tuning the foundations of PriView and developing a
robust and functional solution to the problem of query privacy. To further reinforce the pri-
vacy aspect and improve the scalability of the system, we plan to calibrate Priview to make
further improvements, as part of our future work. A few of them are: addition of multiple
proxies using different cloud providers, improving the quality of the dummy queries and
adding multi-service capability to extend the system into a general-purpose, secure query-
ing platform. Ultimately, PriViews goal is to provide a general-purpose, privacy-preserving
querying platform for real-world services.
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